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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH K. STUMPH, JR.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 15662

vs.
CARLYLE F. GRONN lNG AND THE BOARD
OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COM·
MISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
--...._

Appeal from a decision of the Department of Employment Security,
State of Utah, as upheld by the Appeals Referee
and the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission,
State of Utah
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General
174 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

Joseph K. Stumph, Jr.
3167 South 7945 West
Magna, Utah 84044
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Joaeph K. Stumph, Jr.
Attorney Pro se
3167 South 7945 West
~;,,'11a, Utah 84044
Telerhone 250-5465
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IN THE SUPRD:E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

,'IJ

Joseph K. Stumph, Jr.
PLAIN'l'IFF'S BRIEP' ---

Plaint11'!
ve.

Case No. 77-A-2626

Carlyle F. Gronning and the
Board of Review of The Industrial
Commission of Utah, Department of
&~ployment Security,

Decision, Case No. ??BR-212
Joseph K. Stumph, Jr. ve.
Department of Employment
Security, No, 77-BR-212

De fend:on te

..............••....•..••......................•

Plaintiff was denied unemployment compensation from June 20, 1977
thru June 30, 1977 because the Department of Employment Security, State
of Utah contends that plaintiff was entitled to, or could have taken hie
allotted vacation time from Kennecott Copper Corporation during a scheduled
v~cation

shutdown June 13 thru July 3, 1977.

Plaintiff originally scheduled

his vacation during Karch and April (two weeks) for the purpose of trying
to estJblish a business.

Financing for the venture failed to materialize

and defendant attempted to cancel the

~~rch

and April vacation period and

move it up to the company vacation shutdown in June-July.
reschedule my vacation.

My

iomediate supervisor at the time, Mr. Joe Dalpaiz,

communicated the company's decision of their refusal to
to me

sometim~

in

Kennecott refused to

r~schedule

my vacation,

1977.

~arch,

At my last hearing by the Department of Employment Security which was schedul
January 17, 1978 I

the Department saying I had to work that day and if I

~rote

should lay off work to attend the hearing it would cost me perhaps half as much
as I

mi~ht

expect to gain by a favorable decision by their department.

[] tintiff ""~" f0r
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Sll'l!c'rl, JP.,
Plaintiff,

'iS.

Case l~o.

15662

::APL Yl[ F. r.f<Oiillll.r, All[! TH[ BOARD
OF PE'/I[\·1 OF THt IIIDL'STPIAL Cm~
I.IISSIOII OF UTAH, DEPAPTI·IENT OF
EIIPLOYI~EIIT SECL'R I TY,
Defendants.

DE F E NDANT S

1

8 R I E F

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
lhls is an action before the Supreme Court o• the State of Utah
Pursuant to Section 35-4-10 ( i ) , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking
judicial

review of u decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Com-

mis~ion '·f L'tah,

which cJenied unemrloyment compensation to the Plaintiff for

c.; I SPOS IT I 011 BY LOWER AUTHOR I Tr
f'IJintiff
tho'? period .'ur.c
~endirs

tlenr:fit• ..

·"·,,J

initially filed claims for unemployment compensation for

19 throuyh July 2,

,-l"irllitf .1ppealed.

''r' -JIJ'•-cc:l,

1977,

A Department Representative denied

The Appeal Referee uffirmed the denial of

i>~<" 'loard of Peview affirmed the decision of the Appeal

PefC'r,•c· l'v ,,, 'i-.ic:-n cJat.•J Januc1ry 74,

1Q78,

in Case No. 77-A-2626, 77-BR-212.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decisions :>f the Board of Review anc
the Appeal Referee, which denied benefits to Plaintiff on the grounds he had
received or was entitled to receive remuneration in the form of vacation pay
during the period of the plant shutdown by Kennecott Copper Corporation.
Defendants seek affirmance of such decisions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, an employee of Kennecott Copper Corporation, was denied
unemployment benefits during the period of a vacation shutdown In 1977.

(R.OG:

Upon appeal lng the denial of benefits, two separate hearings were scheduled k·
Plaintiff.

(R.0019, 0008)

(R.0017, 0007)

Plaintiff failed to appear at either hearing.

The Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeal Refere'

on the grounds that the evidence of record was Insufficient to show that Plair·
tiff took his vacation prior to the vacation shutdown under compel I ing circumstances over which he had I lttle or no reasonable control.

(R.0005, 0006)

ARGUMENT
THAT THE APPEAL REFEREE AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT
ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW BENEFITS TO PLAINTIFF ON THE SOLE
BASIS OF HIS UNSWORN LETTER OF APPEAL.
This case Is a derivative of the circumstances which led to the pr :.
mary issues decided by the Court In Mills, et al, v. Carlyle F. Gronning, et
al, Case No. 15622; and Brinkerhoff, et al,

v. Carlyle F. Gronning, et al,

Case No. 15621; decided by the Court on June 26, 1978.

The issues in those

cases arose under circumstances surrounding a vacation shutdown by Kennecott
Copper Corporation during the summer of 1977.

It was he 1d in the Mills anC:

Brinkerhoff cases that individuals who elect to take vacation at a time other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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than a vacation shutdown scheduled in accordance with the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement are not eligible for unemployment benefits pursuant to
Section 35-4-S(hl U.C.A. 1953, unless the election was made under circumstances
over which the individual had I ittle or no control and for which there was no
reasonable alternative.
In the Instant case Plaintiff scheduled his vacation for a period
prior to the vacation shutdown.

The only evidence as to the reason Plaintiff

elected to take his vacation early is Plaintiff's unsworn letter of appeal,
(R.0020) in which Plaintiff alleges that he did so in order to organize and
start a business venture of his own.

PI a inti ff further a I Ieged in his Ietter

of apreal that when financing for his business venture failed to materialize,
~e

requested his vacation be rescheduled to the period of the vacation
but that corl'pany officials denied his request.

~own,

s~c·

When Plaintiff failed

to appear for his scheduled appeal hearing, the Appeal Referee affirmed the
ori~inal
~ceive

~enial

of benefits on the grounds that Plainti•f was entitled to

vacation pay during the period of the vacation shutdown.

(R.0017)

This decision was based Jpon Section 35-4-5(h) of the Utah Employment Security
'ct, as
tiff

<~cS

tr.e .jecision of the Department Representative.

a~peal,cd

nearirq to
·e '·"S

(R.0021l

Plain-

t•j the Beard of Review, ·which body remanded the case for a new

ctt~in

further evidence with respect to Plaintiff's contention that

j.,r.i.cj t11e c.rrortunity to change his vacation to the period of the
(f·'·'='~'iil

Plaintiff again failed to appear at the scheduled

near-inq .,111, ,,ln,ou·lll instructed that he could request the hearing be resched'"le-J if '•
'•O>de nc,

felt his f.'lilure to appear was with good cause, (R.0009l Plaintiff

~·J·r

r· •;u·c .. t . .·r•on Plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearing, the

mattc•r ,,.'".' r•·h·rr•c·J tr,

+f,p

E'oard of Review for a decision.

The Board's
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decision was that the evidence was insufficient to show that the facts of the
case come within the exception provision established by the Board, (R.0026l
(and subsequently approved by the Court in the Mi~~s-Brinkerhoff matters
referred to previously).
The Issue thus presented Is twofold:

(1) Is Plaintiff's unsworn

letter of appeal admissible, credible evidence; and (2) Has Pia inti ff estab1ished by reason of such evidence that the company's refusal to reschedule his
vacation to the shutdown period constituted a compel I lng circumstance beyond
his control, such as to qualify Plaintiff for the receipt of unemployment
benefits?
Section 35-4-lO(el, U.C.A. 1953, provides in part:
The manner in which disputed matters shal I be presented,
the reports thereon required from the claimant and employing
units and the conduct of hearings and appeals shal I be in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the commission
for determining the rights of the parties whether or not
such regulations conform to common law or statutory rules
of evidence and other technical rules of procedure . . . .
Pursuant to the foregoing statutory authority, the Commission has
promulgated the following regulation:
4.b.(ll AI I hearings shal I, after due notice to the parties, be conducted informally and In such manner as to
ascertain and protect the rights of the parties. AI I issues
relevant to the appeal shal I be considered and passed upon.
Any party to an appeal shal I be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and present any pertinent evidence of
probative value and to know and rebut by cross-examination
or otherwise any other evidence submitted. Oral or written
evidence of any nature whether or not conforming to the
legal rules of evidence may be accepted and given Its proper weight.
(Emphasis suppl led.)
There is reason to conclude that the letter of appeal is hearsay
evidence, from the fact that it contains a statement upon which Plaintiff
rei ies, which Is unsworn and not subject to any type of examination by reason
- 4 -
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of Plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearings.
6th Edition, Section 8:1, page 160. l

(See 2

Jones, Evidence,

Whether or not an unsworn statement is

hearsay evidence or some other form of incompetent evidence would appear in
the instant case to be immaterial.

The only evidence available in the case

at bar consists of two unsworn statements, the first from Kennecott Copper
Corporation (R.0022) and the second being Plaintiff's letter of appeal.
The implication of Regulation R4.b.(1) quoted above,

is that all

evidence which ma•; have a material bearing on the outcome of an adjudicative
matter should be admitted in the administrative hearing, subject to being
given appropriate weight by the Hearing Officer in reaching a decision.
This interpretation is consistent with the position of some of the
leading authorities on the subjects of evidence and administrative ~~~example, see 1

rFor

f-'igmore, Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section 40, pp. 42-43; 2 Davis,

Adriinistratiue !.Arw Treatise, Section 14. 12, as supplemented; 36 A.L.R. 3d,
Sections 5, 7, 22, and 27.)
The board of Review did not err in determining that the unsworn letter, standinq by itself,
Plaintiff.

is insufficient to support a finding in favor of

L.:tah by precedent decision follows what is known in administrative

law as the "residual

rule."

(See 1

note 71, at f'· 90.)

The "residual

Wigmore, Evidence, Supra, Section 4c, footrule" basically provides that hearsay evidence

is insufficient in and of itself as a basis tor a finding, unless supported by
le~ally competent evidence.

residual

rule•,

Although many authorities object to the use of the

it rc>mains the law of this jurisdiction.

sions of II,,• nl·jections to the residual
tor8 110i n.1 pJr,l•JI·aph.)

residuul

(For detailed discus-

rule, see the authorities cited in the

The usc of hearsay evidence and the appl icabll ity of the

r·ule i,; r•resented

in a very careful analysis of the issue by Larsen, J.,

- 5 - provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the case of Ogden Iron Works, et al, v. Industrial Commission, 102 U. 492,
132 P. 2d 376 {1942), a Workmen's Compensation case.

in explaining the legis-

lative allowance of hearsay evidence in administrative hearings, Justice

Lar~r

stated:
When the Legislature sanctioned the admission of this {hearsay)
evidence, it follows by necessary Implication that it intended
to authorize the commission to act upon it. But since the
action of the commission results in a determination of the substantial rights of the parties, this court has long been committed to the position that there must be a residuum of evidence,
legal and competent in a court of law, to support a claim before
an award can be made, and a finding cannot be based only upon
hearsay evidence. {Citations omitted.) To say the commission
may receive and consider and act upon hearsay evidence, does
not mean that the commission is obi iged to act upon alI hearsay
evidence presented, but only that it may act upon it where the
circumstances are such that the evidence offered is deemed by
the commission to be trustworthy. {132 P. 2d, at p. 379.)
In the instant matter Plaintiff has alleged that he was compelled to
take

his vacation early by reason of the company's refusal to allow him to

reschedule his vacation to the shutdown period after having originally scheduled it early for business reasons.

The Commission was not compel led to act

upon that evidence alone in view of the many questions left unanswered by

I

Plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearing scheduled for him, and which mi~·
have shed considerable I ight on the extent to which Plaintiff's circumstances
were beyond his control.
I.

Those questions may reasonably have included:

When did Plaintiff request that his vacation be rescheduled to

the shutdown period and did his request a I Iow the emp 1oyer sufficient time to '
make any necessary adjustments in the work schedule?
2.

Could the request have been made earlier, thus providing the

employer more time to adjust to his work schedules?
3.

How definite were Plaintiff's plans to enter a business venture'

Were such plans formalized and ready for implementation, or were thPy yet in
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also
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r existence at the time other vacation-

a,: :ar•icclar reason the business venture had tc have
I

"c·:·-~:r

:eri~:,
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Therefore, the decisions of the Board of Review and the Commission
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for Defendant
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Utah Attorney General
FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mal led a copy of the foregoing Defendant's
Brief to Joseph K. Stumph, Jr., ProSe, 3167 South 7945 West, Magna, Utah
this ____ day o f - - - - - - - - ' 1978.
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